The concept of proxy war—where major powers indirectly confront each other by supporting opposing sides in third-party conflicts—has a long history in the Indo-Pacific region. Historically, the most prominent example was the Korean War (1950-1953), where the United States and Soviet Union clashed through their respective client states. In recent years, a transformation in proxy dynamics, with the Ukraine conflict unexpectedly becoming a battleground for Asian powers’ interests. China has provided material support to Russia, while Japan and South Korea have aligned with Western support for Ukraine, making this European conflict a new frontier for Indo-Pacific competition.
These proxy conflicts have fundamentally reshaped the alliance architecture in the Indo-Pacific, transitioning from the traditional Cold War “hub-and-spokes” model centered on US dominance to what experts characterize as a “cobweb with pivot” structure—where the US remains central but regional powers increasingly develop their own sub-networks of security relationships. The resulting system has created both stabilizing and destabilizing effects; on one hand, the renewed US focus on the Indo-Pacific has revitalized relationships with traditional allies like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. On the other hand, proxy competitions have intensified regional tensions, particularly as China expands its influence through economic initiatives and military cooperation with Russia and Iran.
Looking ahead to the latter half of 2025 and beyond, the Indo-Pacific proxy landscape appears poised for further intensification rather than de-escalation. Several concerning trends suggest proxy conflicts could escalate: the anticipated reduction in US attention to the region under new political leadership may create power vacuums that China will likely exploit, while climate disasters and political instability in smaller Pacific nations create fertile ground for major power competition through economic and security assistance.
